

# **“Culture in Power Transitions: Sino-American Conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”**

**Minerva Project Year II Deliverables**

Principal Investigator: Dr Robert Jervis

Co-Principal Investigators: Dr Erin Jenne and Dr Gregory Mitrovich

# Contents

- review of research objective
- accomplishments,
- next step(s),
- concerns/risks,
- list of presentations/publications

# REVIEW OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

- **Project Objective:** To compare how Soft Power facilitated the rise of the United States and China.
- **Years One and Two:** Preparation of Book Manuscripts (to be discussed in oral presentation) and acquiring data for computer aided text analysis.
- **Year Three:** Completion of manuscripts/preparation of comparative studies, quantitative findings.

# ACCOMPLISHMENTS

- **Books:** 1 published book (Jervis, Princeton Univ. Press), 4 book projects underway (Mitrovich - 2, Hui -1, Popovic/Jenne - 1 [revise and resubmit from Cambridge University Press]);
- **Papers:** Over 35 conference papers, reports and academic articles (most recent: 6 published + 6 under review);
- **Media Appearances:** Hui and Popovic also had media appearances


# DELIVERABLES

## Selected papers

## Major Power Interventions in Regime Conflicts Book (Jenne/Popovic, revise and resubmit to Cambridge University Press)

- Received revise and resubmit this fall, the editor wants the book draft by September 2018;
- 5 RAs collected hundreds of UN speeches on (non)intervention decisions of P5 (USSR/Russia, UK, USA, France and China) in the Afghanistan conflict (1980-present)
- We finished one chapter on major power decision in Afghanistan in the 1980s which was presented at ISA in SAn Francisco in April (next slide)

# Soviet Timeline



# Key Soviet Decision-Makers in 1979



Brezhnev,  
GenSec

Reluctant to  
intervene,  
fears it will spoil  
detente



Andropov,  
KGB Chief

Key “hawk” from March  
1979 when mujahideen  
captured Herat. Advocates  
intervention viciously from  
September 1979 when Amin  
ousts Taraki



Kosygin,  
Premier

Opposes intervention, cites  
Vietnam to argue an it  
would ruin Soviet reputation



Gromyko,  
Foreign Minister

Goes with the  
interventionist flow  
from March 1979, and  
more openly toward  
the end of the year



Alexandrov-Agentov,  
Adviser

Very influential with  
Brezhnev. Vetoes  
“hawks” until mid-1979.  
Vetoes “doves” from  
September 1979



Loss of Herat

Taraki killed, Pershing Missiles,  
Death of SALT

Brezhnev  
is bought over

Jan/Feb

Mar

Apr/May

Jun/Jul

Aug/Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Non-interventionist  
framing dominates

Interventionist framing dominates

**Kosygin:** “the deployment of our forces (...) would immediately arouse the international community and would invite sharply unfavorable multipronged consequences”

**Andropov:**  
“under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan

**Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov:**  
Amin “might change the political orientation of the regime.”

**Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov:**  
Do “everything possible not to allow the victory of counterrevolution in Afghanistan or the political reorientation.”

**Andropov:**  
“Amin's secret activities, forewarning of a possible political shift to the West [including] contacts with an American agent about issues which are kept secret from us.”

# Key Soviet Decision-Makers 1985-1989



Gorbachev,  
GenSec

For withdrawal but wants to make sure it is backed by prior international agreement as face-saving device



Shevardnadze,  
Foreign Minister

Argues for immediate withdrawal, thinks that intervention was a bad idea



Gromyko,  
Foreign Minister

Withdrawal after USSR brokers an international treaty that would make Afghanistan neutral

Stingers

Perestroika

Cold War  
ends

1985

1986

1987-1988

1989

Withdrawal  
framing dominates


**Gorbachev:** “We have been fighting in Afghanistan for already six years. If the approach is not changed, we will continue to fight for another 20-30 years. This would cast a shadow on our abilities to affect the evolution of the situation. We need to finish this process as soon as possible.”

**Shevardnadze:** “everything that we’ve done and are doing in Afghanistan is incompatible with the moral character of our country.”


**Gromyko:** Our strategic goal is to make Afghani□ stan neutral, not to allow it to go over to the enemy camp. Of course it is important to also preserve that which is possible in the social arena. But most important - to stop the war.

**Gorbachev:** “We are obliged to conduct a realistic policy. And this needs to be remembered: there can be no Afghanistan without Islam. There’s nothing to replace it with now. Afghanistan needs to be returned to a condition which is natural for it. The mujaheddin need to be more aggressively invited to [share] power at the grass roots.”

# US Timeline



# Key US Decision-Makers 1985-1989




Carter,  
President

Advocates global protection of human rights, but also concerned that Soviet intervention threatens to Middle Eastern oil routes



Brzezinski,  
National Security Advisor

Key backer and architect of US support for the Mujahideen



Reagan,  
President

Backs spreading democracy to non-democratic countries. Uses Manichean rhetoric to label Soviet Union as “Evil empire” and mujahideen as “freedom fighters”

Soviet  
Intervention

Perestroika

Cold War  
ends

1979

1983

1985

1987

1989

Withdrawal  
framing dominates

Carter:

- Soviet intervention
- “blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior”
- “subjugate[s] the fiercely independent and deeply religious people of Afghanistan”
- “such an assault w[ould] be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”

Reagan:

“You are not alone, freedom fighters. America will support with moral and material assistance your right not just to fight and die for freedom but to fight and win freedom -- to win freedom in Afghanistan, in Angola, in Cambodia, and in Nicaragua. This is a great moral challenge for the entire free world.”

Reagan:

“in Afghanistan, the freedom fighters are the key to peace. We support the Mujahidin. There can be no settlement unless all Soviet troops are removed and the Afghan people are allowed genuine self-determination”.

# Conclusion

Correct prediction

False prediction

## Regime Ideology

USSR & US supported sides to export their ideologies worldwide

Ideology secondary for US until mid-80s  
Waning Soviet interest in defending communist regime

## Defensive Realism

Explains both US and Soviet reluctance to intervene

Why both US and USSR eventually intervened

## Blended Role Theory

Helps explain shift in interventionist policies through the changes in roles and framing of both US and Soviet decision-makers

Role can “lock in” intervention policies until external shock produces the next decisional period when the conflict frames and/or roles are reexamined

Proxy warfare (at least between great powers) may be less calculated to achieve certain military ends in the conflict state than to “perform” a great power role

Great power predisposition toward offensive versus defensive intervention roles appears strongly conditioned by the international structure

# Authoritarian Soft Power or Western Mimesis? An Investigation of Russian and Chinese Cultural Institutes Abroad (sent to Europe Asia Studies)


- What is the logic behind the use of language institutes? Do China and Russia compete with the West for cultural influence and how? What are the effects?
- They copy Western institutes to use them as “scripts” of major power status as part of their aspirational drive for recognition as great powers.
- Russian and Chinese Institutes fail to influence their audience because the design was meant for open societies



British Council



Goethe Institut



Alliance Francaise













Instituto Cervantes







# The International System and the Perceptions of Foreign States

- We propose a simple general spatial model of individuals' attitudes to foreign countries. The model separates three levels: international, domestic, and individual.
- Existing approaches focus on dyadic relations and individuals' attributes. We argue that individuals' perceptions of foreign states are better understood from a more general relational perspective on the level of the international system.
- We use GAP Survey (2005-2014) to show that individuals' views of foreign countries have a simple low-dimensional structure that nearly perfectly reflects to the main dimensions on the international stage as estimated from states' votes and talk at the UN. This gives the structuring dimensions of individuals' attitudes a straightforward interpretation.
- We show that individuals favorability is best interpreted in terms of a system. This interpretation is (i) more general (ii) as we show describes a lot of what goes on (iii) has excellent heuristic value.
- This theory builds on spatial theories of politics and item response theory in psychometrics
- The core of the theory is weighting on unobserved dimensions.
- Relational heuristics and spatial positions: the enemy of my enemy is my friend, "if you're like France than I'm like Russia"

**China 2005****China 2006****China 2007****China 2008****China 2009****China 2010****China 2011****China 2012****China 2013****China 2014**

# People's attitudes and UN Speeches



### United States 2005

UN Vote	0.3	0.7	0.9	0.7	0.8
Fav 2	0.7	1	0.3	0	
Fav 1	0.4	0.1	0.9		
UN Talk 3	0.2	0.2			
UN Talk 2	0.9				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### United States 2006

UN Vote	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.6
Fav 2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	
Fav 1	0.8	0.6	0.9		
UN Talk 3	0.9	0.2			
UN Talk 2	0.2				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### United States 2007

UN Vote	0.4	0.2	0	0.9	0.4
Fav 2	0.6	0.2	0.6	0	
Fav 1	0.7	0	0.3		
UN Talk 3	0.8	0.2			
UN Talk 2	0.1				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### United States 2008

UN Vote	0.7	0	0.5	0.9	0.3
Fav 2	0.2	0.7	0.8	0.1	
Fav 1	0.9	0.1	0.4		
UN Talk 3	0.7	0.9			
UN Talk 2	0.5				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### United States 2009

UN Vote	0.7	0.4	0.9	1	0.2
Fav 2	0.6	1	0.2	0	
Fav 1	0.8	0.2	1		
UN Talk 3	0.9	0			
UN Talk 2	0.4				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### United States 2010

UN Vote	0.9	0.4	0.9	0.6	0.8
Fav 2	0.9	0.2	0.8	0.1	
Fav 1	0.5	0.5	0.7		
UN Talk 3	1	0.1			
UN Talk 2	0				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### United States 2011

UN Vote	0.9	0.8	0.9	1	0.5
Fav 2	0.9	0.1	0.8	0.5	
Fav 1	0.9	0.8	0.9		
UN Talk 3	1	0.5			
UN Talk 2	0.4				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### United States 2012

UN Vote	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5
Fav 2	0.6	0.4	0.2	0	
Fav 1	0	0.2	0.3		
UN Talk 3	0.4	0.1			
UN Talk 2	0.1				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### United States 2013

UN Vote	0.7	0.7	0.7	1	0.5
Fav 2	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.2	
Fav 1	0.8	0.7	0.8		
UN Talk 3	1	0.7			
UN Talk 2	0.8				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### United States 2014

UN Vote	0.5	0	0.5	0.6	0.3
Fav 2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	
Fav 1	0.9	0.8	0.7		
UN Talk 3	0.7	0.4			
UN Talk 2	0.7				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### China 2005

UN Vote	0.5	1	1	0.3	1
Fav 2	0.3	0.8	0.8	0.1	
Fav 1	1	0.6	0.5		
UN Talk 3	0.7	1			
UN Talk 2	0.7				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### China 2006

UN Vote	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.4
Fav 2	0.2	0	0.4	0.1	
Fav 1	0.3	0.4	0.1		
UN Talk 3	0.2	0			
UN Talk 2	0.3				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### China 2007

UN Vote	0.4	0.3	0	0.3	0.9
Fav 2	0.1	0.1	0.4	0	
Fav 1	0.6	0.1	0.3		
UN Talk 3	0.8	0.4			
UN Talk 2	0.1				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### China 2008

UN Vote	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.5
Fav 2	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.1	
Fav 1	0.3	0.2	0.5		
UN Talk 3	0.8	0.7			
UN Talk 2	0.5				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### China 2009

UN Vote	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.9	0.5
Fav 2	0.9	0.7	0.9	0	
Fav 1	0.5	0.7	0.3		
UN Talk 3	0.7	0.9			
UN Talk 2	0.3				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### China 2010

UN Vote	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.7
Fav 2	0.4	0.6	0	0	
Fav 1	0.5	0	0.2		
UN Talk 3	0.9	0.7			
UN Talk 2	0.4				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### China 2011

UN Vote	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.7
Fav 2	0.2	0.4	0.2	0	
Fav 1	0.2	0.5	0.4		
UN Talk 3	0.9	0.6			
UN Talk 2	0.5				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### China 2012

UN Vote	0	0	0.2	0.4	0
Fav 2	0.4	0	0.6	0.4	
Fav 1	0.2	0.5	0.1		
UN Talk 3	0.4	0.2			
UN Talk 2	0.1				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### China 2013

UN Vote	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.6
Fav 2	0.3	0.4	0.1	0	
Fav 1	0.3	0.1	0		
UN Talk 3	0.9	0.7			
UN Talk 2	0.8				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

### China 2014

UN Vote	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.9	0.3
Fav 2	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	
Fav 1	0.1	0.1	0.7		
UN Talk 3	0.6	0.4			
UN Talk 2	0.8				
	UN Talk 1	UN Talk 2	UN Talk 3	Fav 1	Fav 2

# How China Has Outbid American Hegemony With \$oft Power (Hui)

Why is it that China's challenge of American hegemony has not met effective balancing?

International Relations scholars have long insisted that China could not possibly develop the intentions or the capabilities to challenge the U.S. Such optimistic accounts are valid up to the 2008 global financial crisis. Since 2009, Chinese leaders have taken increasingly 'proactive' actions by their own reckoning.

This article begins with regional hegemony as an immediate stepping stone to more distant global hegemony. For China to challenge American hegemony, the first critical mark of victory is to undercut the U.S.'s domination in Asia. China may not (yet) be able to expel America from Asia, but it can deny the U.S. freedom of action, bring America's Asian allies into its orbit, and prevail over Asian states in territorial disputes. By these yardsticks, China's bid for regional hegemony is nearly complete by late 2017.

I argue that China has averted balancing with '\$oft power'. '\$oft power' refers to the use of money to soften the edges of hard power so that China's rise will not trigger pre-mature balancing.

IR scholars have analyzed China's 'charm offensive' and 'multilateral offensive' as evidence of China's 'peaceful rise'. These offensives should instead be seen as counter-balancing strategic tools to escape balancing.

Beijing has also reframed China's rise from a threat to an opportunity by diverting attention from the danger of an ascending Chinese military to the allure of a flourishing Chinese economy.

China's '\$oft power' took a hit when the stock market crashed in 2015-16. However, President Trump has inadvertently boosted China's diminished '\$oft power' by withdrawing from the world. By late 2017, China is set to dominate Asia and beyond. If China's bid for hegemony is ultimately blunted, the checks will come from within rather than without.



# Next Steps

Greg:

- Completed five of seven chapter for first book *Turning Points* examining characteristics that enabled America's rise to power. Currently writing two new chapters examining the Trump presidency.
- Have completed research and introductory chapters for second book *Meaning of the American Century*.
- Finalizing publishers submission package in order to receive contract.

CEU team:

- The Jenne/Popovic book project successfully passed the review stage, now working on book completion;
- Data collection (6 RAs already hired) to be used for the remaining three chapters;
- 1 RA is updating the database, 5 RAs use their language skills to collect primary data on (non)intervention decisions of P5 (USSR/Russia, UK, USA, France and China) in the Afghanistan conflict (1980-present);
- Book draft to be submitted in September 2018 in agreement with the Editor of the Cambridge University Press.

# Next Steps (continued)

Victoria: Confucianism for historical legitimacy - “China: Made in War”

- The CCP’s “cultural governance”
  - Presumption of Confucian grand unity: Unity is China’s natural course of development. Eras of division were aberrations and destined for reunification. Unity brought about stability and prosperity while division led to disorder and decline. Conclusion: National unity is a non-negotiable core interest.
  - Presumption of Confucian pacifism: China was dominant in historical East Asia but never expanded. Conclusion: China’s current rise is not a new rise. China’s culture and history dictate that China will never seek hegemony.
  - Presumption of Confucian autocracy: China’s tradition was authoritarian. Conclusion: The talk of constitutionalism is Western and alien to Chinese culture and history.
- The centrality of war
- The need to examine “historical China” -- Map (next page)
- A related presentation: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gte5UmAxyiE>

# LIST OF PRESENTATIONS/PUBLICATIONS

## Robert Jervis, Principal Investigator:

- “The Torture Blame Game: The Botched Senate Report on the CIA’s Misdeeds,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2015.
- “The Cuban Missile Crisis: What Can We Know, Why Did it Start, How Did it End?” in Len Scott and G. Gerald Hughes, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal*, Routledge, 2015.
- “Turn Down For What? The Iran Deal and What Follows,” *Foreign Affairs online*, July 15, 2015.
- “Socialization, Revolutionary States and Domestic Politics,” *International Politics*, vol. 52, 2015.
- “International Relations Theory,” in Frank Costigliola and Michael Hogan, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 3rd ed, Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- “Presidential Campaigns and Foreign Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 131, Summer 2016.
- “Some Thoughts on Deterrence in the Cyber Era,” *Journal of Information Warfare*, vol. 15, No. 2, 2016.
- “Our New and Better World,” in Sergio Fabbrini and Raffaele Marchetti, eds, *Still a Western World?* Routledge, 2016
- “The Mother of All Post-Mortems,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, forthcoming.
- *How Statesmen Think* (Princeton University Press, Spring 2017.)

## Gregory Mitrovich, Co-Principal Investigator:

- Book Project One: *America's World: The Rise of the United States and Creation of the Liberal World Order* (manuscript).
  - Represented by Lynn Jones Johnston Lit.
  - Currently divided into 11 Chapter, nine of which have been completely researched. Other two chapters were added at the request of prospective publishers.
  - At the request of several editors with whom my agent has been discussing my project, I am significantly revising three of these chapters to incorporate the impact of Donald Trump's victory in the 2016 election.
  - I am discussing the final six chapters which will take me about five months to complete once they are approved.
  - Several publishers are interested and in January I will meet with editors in NY.
- Book Project Two: *Duel for the World: America vs the Great Powers*
  - Research completed for section one, chapters one and two studying UK response to the rise of the US from 1815-1860, then 1880-1914.
  - Research underway for section on Germany, Chapters three and four studying German reactions to America's rise from 1865-1945.
- Draft Article: "End of the American Century?" Regarding the impact of Donald Trump on the future of American standing in the world.

## CEU Team: Erin Jenne, Co-PI; Juraj Medzihorsky, Post-Doc; Milos Popovic, Consultant

- Published:
  - ‘Rhetoric of Civil Conflict Management: UN Security Council Debates over the Syrian Civil War.’ J. Medzihorsky, M. Popovic, and E. K. Jenne. Published in *Research & Politics*.
  - Milos Popovic published a paper on foreign support for alliances between rebel groups in *International Interactions* (forthcoming).
- Manuscripts, Conference Papers, and Non-Peer-Reviewed Publications:
  - ‘Russian and Chinese Institutes Abroad: Continuation of Hard Power by Soft Means.’ J. Medzihorsky and M. Popovic. Revise and resubmit in *Foreign Policy Analysis*. Presented at APSA Annual Meeting, 2016; presented at conference at CEU in Budapest, June 2016).
  - ‘China’s Confucius Institutes: Projecting Soft Power or Defending a Fragile Regime?’ M. Popovic, J. Medzihorsky, & E. K. Jenne. Presented at APSA Annual Meeting, 2016. Unpublished Manuscript (could use suggestions about where to publish).
  - “Stretching the ‘Soft Power’ Concept from Washington to Beijing” A. Tabor and E. K. Jenne. Unpublished Manuscript.
  - Erin and Milos also have 3 chapters on major power intervention into regime conflicts (incl. China) submitted to Cambridge University Press, January 8, 2017.
  - ‘China’s Soft Power Project: Cross-national Surveys Report.’ N. Batričević. A report on questions on China’s image in cross-country surveys with publicly available microdata.

**CEU Team: Erin Jenne, Co-PI; Juraj Medzihorsky, Post-Doc; Milos Popovic, Consultant**

- Continued:
  - Erin and Milos have a co-authored article manuscript summarizing the data findings under submission to *International Organization*.
  - Erin and Milos published a chapter entitled “Managing Internationalized Civil Wars” in the *Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory* (part of the larger Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics project).
  - Milos Popovic collected data on the Soviet propaganda activities and links to communist parties in Western Europe (1948-1964) through a Research Assistant at Stanford University, and in Moscow with the help of Carnegie Moscow and published a blog post on how Soviets used ex-Nazis as proxies in Austria. Data from Moscow is novel and no U.S. university has it.
  - Milos Popovic published a post on *Relations International* blog on how Soviets worked with ex-Nazis in Austria in parallel to contemporary Russian meddling into elections.
  - Milos Popovic preparing a paper on Soviet ties to ex-Nazis to undermine the conservative government in Austria in the early years after WW2
  - ‘Assessing Mass Media Coverage of China in Four OECD Countries: Using CATA to Compare Trends and Topics.’ J. Medzihorsky and E. K. Jenne. Presented at APSA Annual Meeting, 2016.
  - ‘Report on Media Coverage of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)’ M. Popovic and J. Medzihorsky. Unpublished Manuscript.

## Milos Popovic, Consultant

- Media Texts and Appearances
  - Radio Interview to *Radio Belgrade* regarding NATO summit, terrorism, N. Korea & Iraq (in Serbian), 29 May 2017
  - Statement to *Christian Science Monitor* on security in the Balkans, 28 April 2017
  - TV interview to *N1 (CNN affiliate)* on terrorism in Europe (in Serbian), 22 April 2017
  - TV Interview to *Al Jazeera Balkans* on Paris attack and French elections (in Serbian), 21 April 2017
  - Radio Interview to *ARD Presse* on Serbian Presidential Elections, 31 March 2017
  - TV interview to *N1 (CNN affiliate)* on Serbian foreign policy (in Serbian), 11 March 2017
  - Presenting opinion poll on Serbian foreign policy (in Serbian), 8 March 2017
  - Presenting opinion poll on Serbian national security (in Serbian), 14 February 2017
  - Radio Interview to *Radio Belgrade* regarding terrorist attacks in Israel and Turkey (in Serbian), 9 January 2017

## Victoria Hui, Consultant

- Manuscripts Under Submission/Preparation:
  - “How China Has Outbid American Hegemony With \$oft Power”
  - “China’s Buying Spree for Legitimacy”
  - “China: Made and Unmade in War” (Book ms.)
  - “Structural Realism Meets Confucian Peace in China’s Historical IR”
  - “Virtuous Expansion: Chinese Expansion and Nonexpansion in History”
  - ““Today Without Me, How Will There Be You Tomorrow?”: The Fragility of The Balance of Power in Chinese History”
  - “Is History the Judge? Disputes Over Sino-Tibetan History”
- Book Chapters and Articles:
  - “How Tilly’s Warfare Paradigm Is Revolutionizing the Study of Chinese State-Making,” in Lars Bo Kaspersen and Jeppe Strandsbjerg, eds., *Does War Make States?*, Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 268-295.
  - “Confucian Confusion,” in Andreas Gofas, Inanna Hamati-Ataya, Nicholas Onuf, eds., *The SAGE Handbook of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations*, Sage, 2016-17.
  - “The China Dream: Revival of What Historical Greatness?” in Arthur Shuhfan Ding and Chih-shian Liou, eds., *China Dreams: China’s New Leadership and Future Impacts*, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2015, pp. 3-32. ([http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/suppl/10.1142/9189/suppl\\_file/9189\\_chap01.pdf](http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/suppl/10.1142/9189/suppl_file/9189_chap01.pdf))
  - “Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement: The Protest and Beyond,” *Journal of Democracy*, April 2015, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp. 111-121. Impact factor: 1.21



## Victoria Hui, Consultant

- Presentations/Papers:
  - “When Anti-Eurocentrism Becomes Sinocentrism: The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Narrative in Sinocentric IR,” presented at Workshop on Cultural Diversity and International Order held at the Social Trends Institute, Barcelona, March 30-April 1, 2017.
  - “How Pacific Was Historical Asia? It Depends on How You Count States”, presented at the International Studies Association’s International Conference “The Pacific Century?”, University of Hong Kong, June 15-18, 2017; and the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Baltimore, February 22-25, 2017
  - “Historical Asia and Global IR: Confucian Peace or Liberal Peace?” presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Baltimore, February 22-25, 2017
  - “Problematizing ‘China’ and The Dream of Historical Greatness,” presented at “The Nature of Inner- and East Asian Politics and Inter-polity Relations from the 13th to the Early 18th Century,” Seminar at the Institute for Social Sciences of the University of California Davis, co-hosted by Kreddha, September 22-24, 2016.
  - “The Centrality of War in Chinese State Formation,” paper presented at conference on “New Explorations into Methods and Sources for Chinese Studies,” Durham University, September 21, 2015
  - “Money Talks But Money Can’t Buy Soft Power,” paper presented at conference on “China’s Further Rise: Opportunities and Constraints,” the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 17-18, 2015.

## Victoria Hui, Consultant

- Media Commentaries:
  - “Beijing reins in Hong Kong,” *East Asia Forum*, Sep. 1, 2017  
(<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/09/01/beijing-reins-in-hong-kong/>)
  - “20 years ago, China promised Hong Kong ‘1 country, 2 systems.’ So much for promises.” Monkey Cage, *Washington Post*, June 29, 2017
  - “Written testimony “Life Support For ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Urgently Needed” submitted to the *British Conservative Party Human Rights Commission* in March 2016
  - “What The Current Political Storm Spells for Hong Kong’s Freedoms,” *Hong Kong Free Press*, Oct. 17, 2015

## **Victor Shih, Consultant**

--Joined the project as of January 2017

### Plans:

--author a joint article with Greg Mitrovich on China's influence in the global financial community after the 2008 global crisis compared with the US's role prior to World War One

--author another piece with Greg Mitrovich on whether state-sponsored influence "works" as well as societal and market driven soft power

--assist with Erin Jenne on potentially deriving indicators of Chinese activities overseas in different spheres

--Assist in analysis of newspaper data to determine whether activities overseas are state-sponsored or private