THE INSTITUTE OF
WAR AND PEACE STUDIES:
The First Thirty-Five Years

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
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AND PEACE STUDIES:
THE FIRST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS

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INTRODUCTION

“So glad you will accept the position.” Thus Columbia University’s president, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, concluded an interview with William T. R. Fox, who had unsuccessfully struggled to escape being the first director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies (IWPS). The question of who decides was answered this way in 1951. For the next thirty-five years in the fifty year history of the institute, there were other decisions and choices, usually after more lengthy negotiations. The story told here is about the choices made under the first director, William T. R. Fox, and his successor, Warner R. Schilling, that gave form to the way in which the IWPS would function.

Creating an institute in a university separates some academic activities from the traditional departmental structure. It alters the making of choices by undergirding particular intellectual activities, thus changing academic priorities and who gets to rank them. At least one institute devoted to international affairs, the Yale Institute of International Studies, foundered on this rock of university structure. However, a different milieu existed at Columbia University in 1950. In a Gabriel Siver lecture in the spring of that year, President Eisenhower proposed that there be a special entity to study the problem of war. At first conceived as an endowed chair, the concept was soon transformed into the idea of an institute.

An organization, funds, and a director were needed to flesh out this concept. The general’s friends gathered the start-up money, while the object of study was broadened to include peace as well. The Institute of War and Peace Studies would take its place as the only non-area institute among those already established in the School of International Affairs (now the School of International and Public Affairs, or SIPA). The school itself and the first area institutes were a response to the need for professional training and research to face the problems of the postwar world.
Institute of War and Peace Studies

(Eventually there were eight area institutes.) Money from the great foundations provided vital support.¹

The year following his proposal, when Eisenhower became NATO’s Supreme Commander in Europe and moved to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) outside Paris, he found Professor Fox on vacation in France and called him out to SHAPE. Deaf to Fox’s explanation as to why he had written earlier to decline the post, the general more or less appointed him to the position. In vain, Professor Fox explained that he had come from Yale to Columbia the previous year partly to escape administrative responsibilities in order to concentrate on research and teaching. For the next 25 years, the life of the Institute of War and Peace Studies became almost inseparable from his own professional activities and engagement in other university functions.²

William Fox brought with him to his new assignment several years of experience at the Yale Institute of International Studies, of which he had been associate director. The year following his departure, the Yale institute ceased to exist and under the leadership of Professor Fredrick S. Dunn most of the members moved to Princeton to become the Center of International Studies. About the same time several other institutes for the study of security questions were established in universities throughout the country.³

These institutes were the product of academic concern about unprecedented changes in the international environment.

These changes also brought about transformations in U.S. government institutions and policy. One result was the early interest of members of the new Institute of War and Peace studies in what was then called “civil-military relations.”

Chief among the international developments was the threat of nuclear weaponry coupled with the onset of the Cold War. NATO was being organized to implement the North Atlantic Treaty. Europe was divided. Mainland China had come under Communist rule. At the time of the establishment of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, hostilities were still raging in Korea. Later came the Cuban missile crisis. There followed periods of détente between the two superpowers, interspersed with periods of tension. Other global developments were only partly related to this rivalry, including the conversion of colonial empires into a huge number of new and underdeveloped states. Fragmentation of parts of the world’s political structure was soon followed by the movement toward integration of Western Europe. Meanwhile, advances in science and technology were altering the context of international relations. Gradually new concerns gained prominence, including the population explosion and environmental deterioration. Added to these was the phenomenal expansion of international trade and investment, combined with rapid global communication.

While these international developments engaged the attention of members of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, their perspectives were also affected by some national developments. The nineteen-sixties were a period of extreme social upheaval and, for universities, this period’s special manifestation in the student rebellions. For four years following the outbreak in the spring of 1968, Columbia was a notorious scene of enormous academic eruption. Behind much of this disturbance was the growing controversy over the Vietnam War; the unrest continued until United States troops were withdrawn.
PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

All these developments provided the context in which the institute operated and influenced the direction of scholarly activity. To return to the beginning, how was the compass set? Strongly influenced by Frederick Dunn’s management of the Yale Institute, William Fox established a very informal organization at Columbia.\(^4\) The IWPS was essentially a loose band of scholars united primarily by common interests in policy making in foreign affairs, led by the director’s vision of appropriate research. Some sense of the working atmosphere may be derived from the acknowledgement which Samuel P. Huntington wrote in his *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics*:\(^5\) “In the Institute of War and Peace Studies Professor Fox has created a uniquely stimulating and informal setting for scholarly activity; the administrative support is efficient but unobtrusive.”

In planning how the institute would operate, the director received ideas from senior faculty interested in international relations inside and outside the institute. He also learned from the experience of other similar institutions and from people in government and military affairs. Twice, at critical junctures in the institute’s life in 1969 and 1974, the director formally requested advice from members of the institute regarding the future activities of the organization. With documentary evidence unavailable, we can mostly surmise the give-and-take of the informal consultations. Yet the positive effects of this personal kind of collaboration could be felt by the institute members. Fox liked to cite Sir Isaac Newton conceiving of the law of gravitation when an apple fell on him while walking in an orchard. “Newton had the intellectual equipment to interpret what happened to him, and the orchard was to him an ideal place for reflective activity. We have been trying at Columbia to bring together the Newtons and the orchards, that is to

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Procedures and Operational Philosophy

recruit men with intellectual equipment to profit by a favorable intellectual environment and to place them in that environment."

From the beginning, the emphasis was on analyzing the milieu in which policy-makers functioned and on their range of choices, steering clear of policy advocacy. In a 1952 memorandum, the director outlined the task of the scholar as “the search for underlying trends in world politics and emerging long-range policy choices in order to affect the climate of opinion in the light of which the day-to-day decisions could be made.” Opinion leaders would be able to learn about and discuss the findings of research done in the IWPS. In this process, “fewer surprises” would result than those which occurred after the war had ended, such as the precipitous demobilization of the armed forces prior to the Czech coup and the outbreak of the Korean War.

The institute was not engaged in what became known as “peace research,” or in spreading the gospel of pacifism. Instead of seeking to solve “highly topical questions of public policy,” as the director phrased it in his report on the first decade, members studied the conditions under which wiser and more effective policies might be made. Emphasis was on “basic” rather than “applied research,” similar to that in the physical sciences. Members were guided only by the broad set of research priorities in the institute and the terms of supporting foundation grants. As the director saw the institute’s role, members would try to clarify the problems of decision-makers, not solve them. They would “narrow the gap between a preferred future after study and what we would otherwise get.” Members would help policy makers through their studies, but would not participate in the policy decision-making.

How would this be done? Unlike the other institutes in the School, no courses were offered in the Institute of War and Peace Studies. Rather, it became a facility to support the research interests of faculty teaching “non-area” international relations and

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6 Memo, 2/16/54, “The Problem of Creating a Social Environment Favorable to Fresh Insights.”

United States foreign and military policy. In a letter of May 27, 1963, Fox reported to Dean Andrew Cordier that “…the institute has placed great emphasis upon the desirability of having scholars who are engaged in research combine their research with teaching in one or another of the various schools and departments of the University. This is particularly founded on the strong conviction that research is important as a base for teaching and that teaching in turn helps to invigorate research.”

On other occasions he observed that the institute’s activities also broadened the research interests and opportunities of Ph.D. candidates. In addition to serving Columbia faculty, the institute provided facilities for short-term appointments of visiting scholars and research associates engaged in studies related to those being undertaken in the institute.

The manner in which the Institute members went about these tasks varied as time went on. Steering the course set meant that the director felt it necessary to fend off efforts of those outside the institute to share in the decision-making. Nevertheless, the director was ready to acknowledge the support of the university administration as its work took root. In the very early years of the Institute, a “Public Policy Committee” composed of individuals associated in some way with General Eisenhower, and others not in academe, met twice yearly to learn how the institute was functioning. It died of inanition. Meanwhile, the director advised members of the IWPS who attended these dinner meetings to provide their guests with some documentation about what they were researching. Then “when they (the guests) give their speeches, they will be more related to things we want to talk about, rather than the things they want to talk about.” He added that providing such information might mean that when the projects of individual researchers turn out to interest committee members, direct contact could be made.

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8 Andrew W. Cordier was dean of the School of International Affairs from 1962 for about a decade, although he was temporarily acting president of the university when Grayson Kirk resigned following the 1968 student outbreak.

Procedures and Operational Philosophy

In the early 1970’s a challenge came from within the central administration. This challenge, an effort to change the lines of authority of the School of International Affairs and its institutes, eventually faded away. The administration’s effort will be described later as an important aspect of intra-university relations.

The first director chose an “associate director” with whom he informally consulted, as he did with other members of the Institute. Similar informal consultations took place with the successive deans of Columbia’s School of International Affairs, Schuyler Wallace, Andrew Cordier, and Harvey Picker, who were personal friends of the director. He was also personally well acquainted with other high level members of the university’s administration, thus easing communication.
ACTIVITIES

To provide a congenial home for members, the institute provided office space and clerical support. It offered them the opportunity for study and often assistance in publishing the results of their work as well. In various ways, the IWPS promoted discussion of their research and relevant public policy considerations. From time to time, Fox gathered the institute members and a few other interested faculty to hear and comment on research of a member. For example, Kenneth Waltz twice in the early 1960’s addressed such a group with drafts of his book comparing the American and British experience in foreign policy making. In October 1964, Colonel James Boyd, the first Air Force officer assigned to be a research associate, presented his project on United Nations peacekeeping.

Sometimes a formal conference was organized. Inter-university seminars were conducted; some of which also included non-academic participants from the region or the federal government. Special grants were usually needed for these meetings. In 1976, a faculty research seminar provided a formal way that members could come together to discuss their research or hear others engaged in similar pursuits. Described below in more detail, foundations supported a number of special programs on particular subjects, such as civil-military relations and arms control. As part of a series of inter-university faculty seminars administered under the auspices of the School of General Studies, the institute organized and conducted the Atlantic Community seminar, which ran for about two decades beginning in 1962. In addition, guest speakers on some foreign policy issue or other international subject were often invited to address formal or informal luncheon meetings. These meetings were open to interested scholars at Columbia, but sometimes only by specific invitation. The institute offered a university home away from home to visitors from other universities invited to come for various periods. These included foreign guests from many countries, at one time or another from Australia, England, Japan, France, India,
Activities

and Germany, to name a few. Foundation grants were essential for these activities.

After the student riots in 1968, Columbia lost in a competition for a large Canadian studies program offered by the Donner Foundation, but later, starting in 1977, a more modest program was undertaken. Totaling around $180,000, the grant and extensions provided for summer study or research funds to faculty members in the social sciences who wanted to acquire the knowledge necessary to put Canadian content in their courses. Seventeen department members from political science, economics, history and geography, including Barnard faculty, were thus assisted. Twelve graduate students received grants to enable them to put a Canadian component in their dissertations. These included students in political science, history, sociology, anthropology, and law. For a few years, two courses on aspects of Canadian foreign policy were offered by the Department of Political Science in the School of International and Public Affairs curriculum. Occasionally a Canadian prominent in public affairs or academia was invited to address a Columbia group or engage in a seminar, sometimes formally, at other times informally.

In addition, an annual conference was held on a Canadian subject related to American interests. These included “Canadian Federalism and the Quebec Challenge,” “Controlling Technology: the Canadian Experience,” “Clean Air for North Americans,” “Management of Trans-Border Data Flows,” “Regulatory Regimes in Conflict ,” and “Canada and U.S. Interdependence in the Cultural Industries.” The papers and proceedings of the later conferences were published and widely circulated. Most of the speakers were from Canada, but the conferences drew other participants and guests from a wide area. Attendance ran between 70 and 100 at each conference. The first four conferences took place under the original Canadian studies program director, Annette Baker Fox. Her successor, John G. Ruggie, gave the program a new slant when he secured further Donner funding. In cooperation with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, he carried out a program of research and public discussion of a series of studies on critical issues related to “The North American
Economy: The Transnational Dimension.” This was financed by the Donner Foundation with a joint grant, of which the Columbia partner received $45,000. Although no further funds could be secured for the program, some institute members continued to conduct research on Canadian-American relations.10

In the 1980’s Columbia participated in a Ford Foundation-supported program, “Dual Competence,” administered jointly by the IWPS, The Harriman Institute (for Russian Studies), Institute on East Central Europe, and Research Institute on International Change. They spread a wide net for young scholars abroad as well as in American universities to apply for fellowships which would enable the scholar in either international security or Soviet-Eastern Europe studies to acquire competence in the other field. Successful fellowship holders became temporary members of the IWPS.

Ford Foundation money permitted groups of scholars to investigate two different regional security questions under the aegis of the IWPS. One project, on the conflicts among states on the Indian Ocean Rim, involved meetings at which the four authors were joined by other scholars to examine their particular topics. The ensuing book was W. Howard Wriggins, ed., Dynamics of Regional Politics.11 The other project culminated in the publication of Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons.12 Although these projects had their genesis earlier, they were undertaken after the period covered by this study. They followed earlier joint efforts sponsored by the IWPS.

A noteworthy program on the implications of United States arms control efforts for continuing support of European security was special in two ways. (1) It was conducted by a closely articulated team of researchers. Although each member wrote his or her own portions composing one part of the final report, the other part was a joint product. The results were two books published by Columbia University Press in 1973: Warner R.

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10 For example, William T.R. Fox, A Continent Apart: The United States and Canada in World Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).
12 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.)
Activities


(2) The program was conducted as a response to a contract offered by a federal office, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and paid for by a grant of about $125,000. The report to ACDA became entangled in bureaucratic controversy and the ACDA’s objection to some observations, which might possibly have been detrimental to the then current SALT negotiations. It was eventually buried. This unhappy experience justified the institute’s normal avoidance of government contracts because of the restraints on choice.

The institute later administered the New York Arms Control Seminar, from 1977 through 1980, with private financing. Under the leadership of the institute’s second director, Warner Schilling, twenty-four meetings were held, addressed mainly by government officials dealing with United States security policy, and attended by large numbers of Columbia faculty and students. The project also sponsored 19 dinner meetings. More than 400 people participated, including 41 Washington officials, while the rest were Columbia faculty and other security specialists in the New York area. The seminar commissioned five studies, all of which were subsequently published in journals concerned with United States security policy.13

In one earlier exception to the no-government-contracts rule, the institute concluded an agreement with a United States Senate Special Committee to study the Foreign Aid Program, and make a report on the appropriate conditions for an effective military assistance program.

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The report appeared as “Military Assistance Program of the United States, 1947-1956,” in *The Military Assistance Program of the United States* (85th Congress 1st session). It was written by the Fox, the IWPS director, and William W. Marvel, borrowed from the Carnegie Corporation. Other activities will be described below in the section on financing.
SUBJECTS

As might be surmised from the foregoing account of programs, the choice of subjects to be studied depended in part on the support of funding agents. Still, the ultimate decision was the member’s. The first director declared that “members have been encouraged to work on research that seems to them important and feasible rather than to shape their research to accord with the director’s or their colleagues’ interests or priorities.”

He observed that, as the cartographer knows that no one map can accurately combine information on area, direction, and shape, so no one theory may be accurate in explaining the various features of international relations.


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15 Mimeo. “Program for 1971-76”.
Institute of War and Peace Studies

Robert L. Rothstein, *The Weak in the World of the Strong*; Louis Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*; and John G. Ruggie, *Planetary Politics; Ecology and the Organization of Global Political Space*. (Others are mentioned below or are listed in the appendix.) Although these citations are only a sampling, their subject matter also reflects what members were publishing as periodical articles during the same periods. (Reprints of some of these were occasionally circulated under the institute cover to lists of potentially interested readers outside the university.) One of the most prolific authors was Roger Hilsman, whose tenure in the institute was also one of the longest. (Like several others, he had earlier been a student of the first director.)

An early program, funded by the Carnegie Corporation, was an extensive series of studies of civil-military relations. Several of the studies eventually appeared as books. However, neither the first nor the second IWPS director completed their projects. Perfectionists both, they did publish portions of their studies, but never the completed product. In Fox’s case, nine articles were harvested from his general program.

As time went on, the subject matter of institute scholarship gradually shifted away from more narrowly defined “national security” questions to a much wider interest in international affairs. Nor were states the only actors to be considered. Learning about foreign policy behavior “on the other side of the hill” would help Americans to see themselves as foreigners saw them. With this in view, the first director on several occasions proposed changing the name of the institute to the “Institute of World Political Studies,” but he had no takers. Although the name remained unchanged, the work of some members of the institute reflected this perspective. Robert Cox, for several years the institute’s international organization specialist, concentrated on transnational relations and social and political aspects of production systems in the global context. Fox’s notion that “peace is not enough,” was gradually manifested in studies dealing with north-south problems, including technological transfer and population pressures, and to concerns for “the planet Earth.” Such interests carried forth his focus on the “great transformations in world politics” from the beginning.
declared to be a concern of the institute. Yet security questions continued to appear among the studies of institute members, for example, in books on border conflicts and on terrorism.\textsuperscript{17} While the director and his successor continued their work on civil/military relations, attention began to turn as well towards problems in what became labeled as “international political economy.”

Two programs on “world order,” the Compton and Wallach undertakings to be described below, looked further. They were based on the expectation that studies could lead to actions on matters of social injustice and ecological stability as well as peace, at least by indicating possible alternative courses. The most theoretical investigations still had policy implications. In Fox’s view, “policy relevant” studies, by clarifying the range of choice, could respond to “the middle run needs of a society whose governors are so preoccupied with the urgent present that some disinterested scholars ought to be thinking ahead in a way they can’t or haven’t.”\textsuperscript{18} Earlier he had contrasted this role with “policy-oriented” studies, which \textit{prescribed} choice.

\textsuperscript{17} Examples were Friedrich Kratochwil, Paul Rohrlich, and Harpreet Mahajan, \textit{Peace and Disputed Sovereignty: Reflections on Conflict Over Territory} (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985) and J. Bowyer Bell, \textit{A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence} (New York: Basic Books, 1978).

\textsuperscript{18} Speech at retirement, April 1980.
Who engaged in the activities of the institute and how were they chosen? Association with the IWPS was somewhat amorphous. Nevertheless, some characterization is possible. Almost all members were also members of a regular department at Columbia (or Barnard), the vast majority in the Department of Public Law and Government, later re-named Political Science. They ranged from full professor to instructor or lecturer. In later years, a few were retired faculty members, having reached the age of 68 (until recent years the age of compulsory retirement). The institute paid for “bought” time from faculty members’ regular teaching responsibilities. Especially in the earlier years there were associates from other departments or schools, such as Law, Business, Engineering, General Studies, Economics, and History. For example, Seymour Melman, a professor of industrial engineering, was appointed an institute member to conduct a study on disarmament, published as *Inspection for Disarmament*.19

Visiting members (always academic and often from abroad) came for a semester or year from other institutions. Whether a visitor or from Columbia, many who were chosen for IWPS membership had at least some government experience. Visiting associates with research grants used the institute as an academic home, and others without grants were accepted by the director if their work fit the institute’s general program. Some visitors were invited to help conduct a specific program, such as studies of civil-military relations and the ACDA project mentioned earlier. Very informally, the director would invite foreign academics whose work coincided with IWPS interests to spend time at the institute when they were available.

Compared to similar institutes in other universities, the IWPS was small. Depending on how the associates were classified, the numbers grew only a little from the 1950’s, when there were only nine. Between the mid-1960s and 1986, the numbers ranged from thirteen to close to twenty, the larger number

19 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.)
Staffing

including some people with only peripheral membership. A report made for the academic year 1973-74 indicated that there were about twelve continuing members, including nine full-time Columbia appointments, one emeritus professor, and two research associates, one of whom also taught part-time. There were also three part-time members from other academic institutions and four whose association consisted of receiving IWPS support while completing a book.

Availability of office space sometimes limited the addition of new associates. At least twice the institute turned down an offer by a federal agency to provide an official “in residence” as a result of space problems. Space was found for a U.S. Air Force colonel for about two decades, beginning in 1964. An officer was nominated each year by the Air Force, to serve (usually) for one year. Often the fruits of the officer’s research appeared in a published article. The first appointment resulted in the holder deciding to continue his doctor’s degree, after which he became a university professor. The other appointees returned to their military duties, at least for a while, and were reported to be making good use of their research experience in the institute. As the first director wrote to a commanding officer, “It is always useful to have as a colleague a professional military man with a point of view, technical understanding, and knowledge of who in Washington knows what that our non-military researchers do not always have.”

Although the institute agreed to participate in this program, which included several academic institutions, it had no choice in naming the particular appointment. Nor did the appointee have a role in deciding his assignment. The command character of the arrangement led to its demise in the mid-1980’s, despite the friendly and fruitful association of the Columbia members of the institute with their successive military colleagues.

In the early days of the institute some visitors were persons of substantial academic reputation elsewhere (Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, for example). Others who were assisted

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would later become well-known scholars (Kenneth Waltz and Samuel P. Huntington, for example). Until later years, women scholars were very few, but more numerous than in the Department of Political Science, which had its first tenured female professor in the 1980’s.

The first director, William Fox, characterized himself as “not a clean-desk man” and one who had difficulty in delegating. He was ultimately responsible for selecting institute members, but he regularly consulted with others in the institute and with the School of International Affairs dean, and especially with the institute’s associate director, who was acting director when Fox was on leave.

Associate director Warner Schilling, who served during the later years of the first director’s tenure, ultimately became the next director. He first came to the IWPS in 1953, shortly after receiving his doctorate in political science from Yale and after briefly serving at the Princeton Center of International Studies. From 1957 to 1958 Schilling taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He returned to Columbia as assistant professor in the Department of Public Law and Government, and became an associate professor in 1962 and full professor in 1967. He was the last “associate director,” a position existing only under the first director’s tenure. In nominating him as director, the dean of the School of International Affairs consulted members of the institute to obtain a consensus prior to acting.

No account of staffing the Institute of War and Peace Studies would be complete without noting the indispensable support of the secretary, later administrative assistant, Anna Hohri. For over twenty-five years, until she decided to retire in 1985, she performed a wide variety of duties to maintain the organization. The directors could not have managed without her, as they readily admitted. Those who followed had different titles: “administrative assistant” became “program coordinator.” Though serving faithfully, none remained for more than a few years. Most of them deserved the words of praise the departing acting director bestowed on Jennifer Thorne, who succeeded Anna Hohri: “You were indefatigable and highly imaginative in dealing with the marked
individuality of the nine senior faculty associated with the institute. You were patient with our foibles and cheerful in coping with our urgent and sometime mutually competitive needs, which all too often came upon you with very little advance notice. Whenever possible, you foresaw our needs and where that was not possible, you rapidly accommodated them, often on very tight deadlines. . . . Particularly aggravating were the detailed demands of Columbia’s complicated bureaucratic structure. You managed to handle numerous salary and research accounts with intelligence and care. Your meticulous oversight of the unreliable and unresponsive comptroller’s department was indispensable to ensure funds were not lost within the system.”

The office administrators were assisted by work-study students, who helped to provide an ambience friendly to young people in international relations graduate programs.

Once appointed, institute members were more or less on their own, their activities chiefly shaped by the academic culture of the IWPS as it was molded by the director. They were from time to time requested to make a report of their research activities, mostly at the urging of other university officers.

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FINANCING

The director did not have a free hand; naturally he was circumscribed by the availability of funds for the institute. A small portion was in the form of general income, provided through the School of International and Public Affairs, whose funds in turn were allocated along with other schools by the university administration in Low Library. These funds were for office supplies, telephone, and similar needs, and also for the salary of the secretary when this position was held by Anna Hohri. A university-wide budget crisis in the mid-1970’s meant that the institute, along with other parts of the university, suffered a budget cut. In an earlier period, Fox felt it necessary to guard against the possibility “that the institute’s tiny resources not be a pot into which the university dips in order to discharge its normal obligation for in-rank salary increments—whether for merit, length of service, or across-the-board reasons.”\(^{22}\) Still earlier, not long after the institute’s inception, Fox noted in a memorandum of Feb. 16, 1954, that it had “as an important asset the sympathy and support of the University’s senior administrative officers. Research institutes which do not enjoy such support wither rapidly on the vine.”

The main source of the institute’s income, however, was through grants from foundations, thus justifying the director’s comment that the institute was “self-financing.” It had no endowment. The director normally took the initiative in seeking a grant, sometimes on suggestions from an institute member or on being advised by a potential source that an application would be welcome. Making a grant inevitably gave the foundation some influence on how the institute operated, or at least on what its members did.

Although the first foundation grants came early in the life of the institute, it began with start-up funding from money, $75,000, provided to the institute from friends of General

\(^{22}\) Letter to Wallace Sayre, Chairman, Department of Political Science, May 22, 1963.
Eisenhower’s, led by General Edwin N. Clark. For a few years representatives of these donors met once or twice a year as an advisory committee, as already noted.

Some of the committee members expressed the desire to be more helpful in guiding the attention of the research staff to practical problems. In response, the director said: “A group such as this can help in the first instance to ensure that the research people are asking the right questions. It can help at the end of the research process to translate research results into an impact on policy. In the intermediate stage the research man needs to be left alone. . . . We need a considerable interval of time before we can grind out conclusions.”

Foundation grants provided the leeway the director sought. Until early in the 1970’s, money made available by the large foundations was mostly in the form of “program grants” to the institute. Rather than for specific projects, these grants were made for very broadly defined purposes. As Fox argued in an appeal to President Grayson Kirk, Dec. 8, 1960, for a substantial allocation from the very large Ford grant to Columbia for international relations research:

If a research institute is to be an integral and effective part of a combined teaching and research program, it should have a range of potential interests that corresponds to the intellectual interests of the senior faculty associated with it. If they and their University are to maintain leadership in research and graduate training, the institute must have resources not earmarked for particular projects. Indeed, it must have such funds if it is to have project grants. This is because it takes staff and project planning effort to get project support, and it costs money to develop research plans and assemble staff.²⁴

²³ Minutes of Policy Committee meeting, June 14, 1954.
He continued to appeal for program grants in the mid-1970’s, by arguing that they “should bring among the institute members a greater sense of corporate identity and vitality, a somewhat higher visibility, and a clarification of shared research priorities…” This was a somewhat different argument than Fox made when the institute was still in its early formative stage, which was that the IWPS needed funding as a “program planning and research administering device.” To meet the fund-seeking problem of the School of International Affairs institutes, Dean Harvey Picker suggested in a “Five Year Report” in 1977, that the institutes together have the common services of a finance campaign professional. The proposal fell on barren ground.

The wide choice in directing institute activities came to an end when the foundations became interested only in more narrowly defined subjects. Among practical effects of this change, the director had to guard the institute carefully from financial obligations to address current issues with immediate practical objectives instead of confining analysis to middle and long run conditions of policy choice. Another effect was described by Fox in his 1974-1975 report as follows: “However difficult the position of the Director as professor-researcher-editor-administrator-fund raiser may have been in the past, it will be more difficult in the future. Institute members are having to learn to be their own research entrepreneurs.” To ease this process, he circulated a list of twelve different kinds of research projects, which he also promoted in discussions with the large foundations. He stressed their interdisciplinary and inter-area character. His successor, Warner Schilling, regularly demonstrated his editing skills and incisive critiques of grant proposals, with positive results. For example, in a four-page single-spaced critique of the wording of a grant proposal to a large foundation, he wrote: “What I find missing in the present draft is any description of the questions/hypotheses to be researched. You have advanced points

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26 Appendix I, 1960.
27 Dean of the School of International Affairs from 1972 to the mid-1980s, shortly before the end of this history.
and propositions with which I have no quarrel, but you have not yet described any curiosities about these points of propositions that might be researched.”

In another minutely formulated critique, he wrote: “I do not think it is a good idea to be so uncertain and certainly not in our lead-off paragraph…” On the other hand, he continued, “I am disturbed by the uncertainty introduced by the term ‘probably.’ . . . Why do we not say we will produce a series of papers designed for a symposium volume?” The grant was eventually made.

The following brief sketch of major fund-givers and their contributions to the IWPS suggests the principal way the institute was supported. The first large foundation grants were two made by the Carnegie Corporation in the 1950s, totaling a little over $200,000. These funded research in the making of national security policy. In the next decade about a dozen studies in this field were published under the aegis of the institute. Over the years, the Rockefeller Foundation financed several studies, conferences, and publications in international relations theory. In addition, from 1956-1969 the foundation provided several grants, totaling about $255,000, for research and fellowships in international organization. The fellows program included foreign scholars. It was administered within the IWPS by Leland Goodrich, a leading authority in the field and senior member of the institute. His collaborator was Louis Henkin, a noted law school professor who was also a member of the IWPS.

By far the largest financial contribution to the institute came from the Ford Foundation. Solicited by the director and the School of International Affairs’ first director, Schuyler Wallace, this foundation eventually provided over three million dollars to the School of International Affairs for international studies. These grants, made in 1960 and 1965, provided the most of the IWPS funding.  

Allocations from these grants began in 1961, with a two-year, $50,000 grant to the IWPS, and continued with further allocations later. Of this money, for example, about $2,400 paid partial salary and fringe expenses for the director and associate...
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director; about $74,000 went for partial salary and for fringe expenses for 11 other members of the Institute; and about $4,765 covered incidental expenses, such as office supplies, conference attendance, and clerical services in 1966-1967.29

When the Ford program grants expired in 1970, a transitional grant was made which permitted the institute and others in the School of International Affairs to adjust to the end of this type of assistance. Of this three-year grant of $760,000 to the School of International Affairs, the IWPS received $100,000 for faculty research and $70,000 for visiting scholars and research associates.

Although the Ford Foundation changed its focus and methods, it did make some specific grants for further projects in which the institute was involved. For example, funds were provided to Bowyer Bell, then an IWPS member, to study “The Impact of Revolutionary Conflict on World Order”. As previously mentioned under “Activities,” there were also grants for the New York Seminar on Arms Control, the “dual competence” program, and the regional security studies.

As the general support from the Ford Foundation faded out, other foundations financed particular activities. Mention has already been made of the Donner Foundation grant for the Canadian Studies Program, which ran from 1977 to 1985. Another example was the grant of $30,000 from the Institute for World Order for a study of territorial conflicts, resulting in a book referred to earlier.

A major benefactor to Columbia for many purposes, Ira D. Wallach also provided funding for ten years for a Chair in World Order Studies referred to earlier. A committee which included the benefactor made the nomination for appointment by the Department of Political Science. (This rather unusual position for an outside financial supporter was granted at his request.) The chair could be held by a Columbia faculty member or a professor from another institution, appointed annually or biannually. Originally rotating, during the later years of the grant the chair was

held by the benefactor’s preference from another university, a well-known specialist in world order concerns. Another important benefactor, Randolph Compton, financed the Dorothy Danforth Compton Seminar on World Order, which brought together faculty members to discuss a great variety of international concerns in addition to security matters, as described earlier. Eventually it was joined by the New York University Seminar on Political Economy.

The grantor hoped that the seminar would eventuate in action beyond “experts talking to each other.” Like the Wallach grant, attention was to be directed to north-south relations, environmental problems, and other global concerns, in addition to war.

The Earhart Foundation provided for a series of faculty seminars in which seasoned researchers and neophytes in the social sciences could discuss their on-going research and receive suggestions. This seminar in a sense revived the custom followed in the early 1960’s of informal institute meetings to discuss the ongoing research of individual members. The Earhart seminar focused particularly on aiding younger scholars.

Individual members also received foundation grants, which they used at the institute. In addition, many of the visiting associates brought with them funding from foundations. Some individuals had grants from federal endowment funds or administrative agencies for specific studies but the institute did not, apart from the ACDA contract. MacArthur money was available in the School of International and Public Affairs beginning in the 1980’s; members could apply, but the IWPS was not involved in distributing it. A proposal by three institute members to study “Nuclear Winter and Peaceful Summer,” involving efforts to avoid two potentially catastrophic changes in the global climate failed to secure a MacArthur grant. This time, as sometimes in the past when members had submitted elaborate applications for a foundation grant, they “drilled a dry hole,” as Fox phrased it. On one occasion the fortuitous absence of several members of the institute who were on leave gave the fateful impression of “too many empty silos,” dooming an appeal. This misapprehension may have contributed to the institute’s lost chance to become one of the Ford Foundation’s endowed centers for research on
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international security and arms control policy. In any case, it took great budgetary ingenuity to spread pieces of grants by “mortgaging” them to get other funds, employing certain sums as “seed money” or “yeast,” or otherwise making imaginative combinations of available funds, including from “general income.” Thus the directors enhanced their financial resources.

As might be expected, competition for control of the funding described above regularly took place. Inside the university there were many players. Fox expressed his concern in a letter to Bernard Brodie, Feb. 4, 1972, writing that he was “rather jealous of all the money going to the twenty-one million dollar marble palace,” and wishing “a few million were available for the international relations programs, which are all in deplorable financial shape.” Furthermore, Low Library (the central administration) regularly claimed larger “overhead” shares in particular grants, a potential loss to the institute and an obstacle in seeking new grants.

As director, Schilling fought hard in cooperation with the Canadian Studies director to prevent the serious diminution in a Donner Foundation grant when the university demanded a 25% overhead, instead of the earlier cut of 10%. He succeeded in demonstrating that the university would be worse off financially if the larger overhead were required. In 1981 the director complained of the “insensitivity” of the central administration, “recently demonstrated in the tax levied on the institute’s gift income for AY80.” He was referring to a new cut from the top of grants even before overhead for projects was charged.

Allocation of the large Ford Foundation grants in the 1960’s was a lively subject of controversy, with the director heavily engaged in claiming the institute’s share. At the very beginning of the million dollar Ford Foundation grant for research and training in international relations, the director struggled to prevent an outside committee from making the decisions as to its disbursing and especially to avoid efforts to employ it for public relations reasons when financing for the new building for the


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School of International Affairs was going on. As Fox wrote January 15, 1962, in a four page letter to Schuyler Wallace, his very close collaborator who was about to retire as head of the School of International Affairs:

On the Ford grant, my fear is that public relations and patronage considerations are taking precedence over the ones we advanced when we asked Ford for the money. To have the allocations made seriatim on the basis of advice from a committee set up for another purpose and several of whom can only have kibitzing opinions about what is useful international relations research seems to me to be absurd. It makes it more likely that the dominant questions discussed about each proposal will be: How will this look in the papers? How will it look downtown among the potential donors for a new building? How much gravy has already been ladled out to the Department or that institute? Why should Bill Fox be passing his plate back for a second helping when so and so has not even had a first helping?

Competition within the School of International Affairs over obtaining foundation support intensified the dilemma faced by the director: the dean could secure much larger sums than individual institutions seeking their own funds separately, but as a result, the institutions had to accept a dilution of their decision-making capacity. They had to recognize that the dean could make a good case for the need to coordinate and to prevent institutes from getting in each other’s way in seeking foundation grants. The Ford Foundation provided a second grant of five million dollars for distribution to the institutes in 1965-70.

Aside from foundation grants, the allocation of “general income” funds by the dean produced additional competition among the institutes; the Institute of War and Peace Studies regularly secured a somewhat larger percentage than some. This was partly because it shared the financial burden for the teaching faculty, offering members financial compensation for their research and paying for their reduction in teaching responsibilities, as well as
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furnishing office space and the like. Some Donner Foundation funds specifically aided faculty grant holders to alter their existing courses by increasing their knowledge of the Canadian aspects of their subjects.

The transfer to the Department of Political Science of some office expense was a threat intimated by the director in the early 1980’s, when the central administration had cut the general income budget. As both he and his predecessor were wont to point out, the institute never made a clear differentiation between research and teaching in spite of the absence of institute courses. For example, the doctoral examinations for international relations majors were administered by the institute rather than by the Department of Political Science.

Financing issues were not confined to the university. Unhappiness in the late 1960’s with the lax accounting for the expenditure of its large grants for international relations research led to complaints by officers of the Ford Foundation. The situation was corrected as the university recovered from administrative tumult and the financing of the new School of International Affairs building was completed. In making the transition grant of June, 1970, the Foundation laid out conditions that included the following:

that the grant funds will be used substantially in accordance with the attached budget. The grant is made only for the purposes stated in this letter, and the funds under the grant may not be expended for any other purpose without the Foundation’s prior approval in writing. Grant funds will be returned to the Foundation if these funds are not expended or committed for the purposes of the grant and within the period stated. . . .

A written report is to be furnished to Mr. Sutton [Deputy Vice President Francis X. Sutton] upon completion of the grant period. Since the period of the grant exceeds one year, interim reports are to be furnished annually in addition to the final report. These reports should contain a financial accounting in accordance with the categories stipulated in the attached
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approved budget and a narrative account of what was accomplished by the expenditure of the funds.

Fox reminded President Cordier August 2, 1970, inter alia, that “the annual report should contain statements by the Directors...as well as by the Dean of the Faculty of International Affairs...Frank Sutton is interested in the considerations of educational and research policy that guide choices in spending Ford funds...[C]are must be taken in future budgets to make sure that Ford-financed staff and services are not used for the operations of the School and the Graduate Facilities.”

Like other institutes, the IWPS director sometimes had to battle the inscrutable and inflexible methods employed by the comptroller’s office, which restrained him from engaging some promising visiting scholars, among other difficulties. One School of International Affairs dean, more familiar with the business world, referred to the university’s accounting practices as “bizarre and Byzantine.”

Fox tried to make clear to potential grantors that the institute was focused on middle and long run policy-making, not on supporting particular policies currently at issue. As he once wrote:

We cannot view world order studies as primarily a problem of spreading known truths to the unfortunately great ‘unwashed.’ The thrust of our collective activities is therefore not curriculum constructing or the writing of primers in world order building. Neither, however, need it be so purely methodological as to be sterile of policy implications”31

During the period of student uprising there came a disturbing challenge to the way in which the Institute of War and Peace Studies, as well as the whole School of International Affairs, were financed. A Columbia Spectator editorial on October 13, 1969, complained that funds which were raised to provide for the

31 Compton file.
new School of International Affairs building and international affairs studies were “diverted” from more worthy university activities, such as domestic problems and urban affairs. This produced a response drafted by the institute’s director November 5 and signed by about 25 professors involved in the school. It began, “Big lies get believed if unchallenged.” The letter proceeded to explain how the funds were raised for the building and pointed out that in fact the school and the institutes more than paid their own way. It praised Columbia’s leadership in opening up studies of the world beyond the United States and Western Europe. It explained the need for foundation help, and summarized the support given for additional facilities for graduate teaching and research. For example, “the load of doctoral dissertations supervised by members of the Faculty of International Affairs who would not otherwise be at Columbia is staggering.” Student concern also produced a university committee on “Externally Funded Research and Instruction,” which directed its attention particularly to government sources, especially those concerned with national defense. Although the Institute of War and Peace Studies was not directly involved, individual members felt it desirable to explain their own connections. With the waning of the Vietnam War student challenges subsided.
INTRA-UNIVERSITY RELATIONS

Aside from the controversies over funding, the IWPS was also involved in other kinds of relations with the rest of the university. Columbia was accustomed to the existence of institutes separate from the traditional departments, but differences of opinion on how independently they should function were inevitable. For a few years in the early 1970’s, all of the school’s institutes were involved in a struggle with the Vice President for Academic Affairs and Provost. He tried to rationalize the direction of the school and its elements and to increase control by the central administration. His proposals for closer, direct links to the institutes in the School of International Affairs appeared to lessen the dean’s authority. Commenting in defense of the regional institutes, Fox reported to the dean:

Although I did not hear anybody say that he was in favor of having his own institute walk the plank, simply to make the Faculty of International Affairs administrative structure look simple when looked at from Low Library, I did hear people say that except where there are overwhelming reasons for doing differently it is better to keep the sign on the doors of each institute. I said that the University’s commitment to the study of non-Western areas was for all practical purposes irreversible, and that some organization for the management of each major region’s teaching is indispensable. . . . A countervailing force is needed to secure that the relevant departments will in fact make adequate provision for regional studies.

The dean, with much advice from the institute directors, claimed that the current structure defining his role and the location of the institutes inside the Faculty of International Affairs was adequate for decision making. They did make some proposals. These eventuated in the establishment of advisory committees for

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each institute, with department representation and a tie to Low Library. As Dean Picker observed in asking the cooperation of the directors, such committees could aid in educating Low Library and the departments about the institutes’ activities. Acquiescence to Low Library proved to be pro forma. The dean and directors could accept “consultation” but not binding advice or policy direction from above.

Strict hierarchical authority within a university goes against the academic grain; the years-long tug of war eventually petered out, although it did result in a more detailed accounting by the institutes of their on-going activities. Strangely, the competition of the school and institutes with the provost occurred after the institutes no longer had substantial funding available to spend without clear guidelines. However, the university as a whole was facing a budgetary crisis at the time of the vice president’s effort. (Relations with the university’s Office of Projects and Grants were more harmonious, and the IWPS often found it helpful.)

Within the School of International Affairs, the regular directors’ meetings with the dean were the occasion for serious discussion of common problems. The IWPS, like the other institutes, regularly made reports to the dean on their activities. (In the mid-1960’s Dean Cordier even asked members to report on their summer occupations.) Some of the reports requested by Low Library were for public relations use.

The trusting personal relationship between successive deans of the School of International Affairs and the IWPS director substantially reduced the likelihood of friction. Informal consultations regularly took place in a cooperative fashion. For example, on occasion they sought foundation aid together. Fox had similarly close personal relations with succeeding associate deans, at least six altogether.

When the first head of the School of International Affairs, Schuyler Wallace, went on leave in 1957, the IWPS director took his place as acting head as well as filling three other offices the dean held. The first director’s position on a large number of university committees, inside and outside the Faculty of International Affairs, promoted coordination and protected the
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institute’s domain. For example, in 1969 he was chairman of the Committee on Instruction of the School of International Affairs, as was his successor as director of the institute, Warner Schilling. Fox was also a member of the university’s Committee on Educational Policy. He served on the executive committee of the Institute for the Study of Science in Human Affairs, which, incidentally, he helped to establish. (Although short-lived, it conducted some pioneering research, including that of Victor Basiuk, author of Technology, World Politics, and American Politics.) Not just because of Fox’s formal positions but also because of his lengthy tenure at the university, his counsel was often sought and accepted. As he would say, he “knew where the skeletons were buried.”

Contact among the School of International Affairs institutes was greatly facilitated when they were all relocated to the new International Affairs building in 1970. The IWPS had earlier moved from its brownstone apartments on 117th street (torn down for the new building), first to Uris Hall (School of Business), and later to 113th street, McVicker Hall: three moves in six years. The new building also housed Lehman Library, containing a collection of the most sought after social science and international affairs publications. Seminar rooms adjacent to each institute were an added facility. However, when Dean Cordier was pressed to produce more rooms in the building for general instructional purposes, the room allotted to the IWPS was given to the registrar for assignment. It took years for Schilling, aided by Dean Picker, to get it back for the institute.

Not just physical proximity encouraged contact between members of the various institutes. The directors of some of the regional institutes had close personal ties with the IWPS, either as earlier members or because of working arrangements with the director of the IWPS. In addition, some projects involved joint sponsorship between the IWPS and one or more of the regional institutes.

Members of the IWPS served on School of International and Public Affairs committees, such as that which administered the 1985 grant to the school made by the Pew Charitable Trust’s
Initiative in Diplomatic Training for case studies. Two books were jointly sponsored with the Russian Institute and one with the Research Institute on International Change. Contacts were particularly close and frequent between the Institute on Western Europe and the IWPS. At one time there was talk of their merging, when Donald Puchala, a former member of the IWPS, was director of the Institute on Western Europe. Teamed with the regional institutes in some adversarial relations with Low Library, the IWPS nevertheless did not share the burden of teaching responsibilities that complicated the regional institutes’ relationships with the administration.

One other non-area institute, the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, whose name was later changed to the Research Institute on International Change, was created in 1961 and directed by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Relations between this institute and the IWPS were not very close. Yet the description of their respective activities in the 1986 School of International Affairs catalog suggested some convergence (or overlap). In 1986, a few years before the demise of the RIIC, Fox, by then retired, described the activities of the two institutes as follows:

It is not useful to demarcate turf boundaries between the RIIC and the IWPS; it may be enough to point out that the IWPS is mostly staffed by full-time professors whose research leads not only to publication but to an enrichment of the faculty’s intellectual capital and that RIIC’s distinctive contribution has been to bring visiting scholars to the campus while they complete promising work in progress.33

For some time, starting in 1957, the IWPS and particularly its director were involved in the creation and functioning of the Council for Atomic Age Studies. The Council directed its attention to identifying and analyzing problems resulting from major scientific and technological developments associated with

33 “Random thoughts about future directions”, note to Acting Director, Nov. 6, 1986.
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the atom. It was directed by a group of faculty from various disciplines, including law and science, but its activities were most closely associated with the IWPS.  

34 (In 1966 the Council was transformed into the Institute for the Study of Science in Human Affairs, which ceased in 1972.)

While earlier in the life of the IWPS membership included faculty from other departments, gradually the institute became composed only of scholars who were also in the Department of Political Science. Thus that department’s relations with the IWPS became more important that those of other departments. More than once, Fox resisted pressure to chair the department. Cooperation was the rule. It helped that the Department of Political Science was also housed in the International Affairs building (as was Economics.)

Members of the institute, like others in the departments, usually had several collegial tasks aside from their research and teaching, such as chairing the Committee on Instruction or Admissions Committee of the Faculty of International Affairs. Thus they were personally knit into other parts of the university aside from their institute membership. Faculty seminars brought individuals from related departments together with those in the IWPS. Grants under the Canadian Studies Program went to faculty in several of the other social sciences to add to their knowledge of the Canadian aspects of their courses. There were earlier instances in which the institute supported research of members of other departments or schools, including law, history, and sociology. In such fashion, the institute could reasonably be described as “inter-disciplinary,” even though, unlike the area institutes, its members were mostly political scientists.

Aside from department relations, the IWPS occasionally cooperated with other university organizations. In 1956, Fox prepared a paper on military representation for Columbia’s American Assembly when it held a conference on the general

In 1982, the IWPS joined the School of General Studies in holding a forum on nuclear weapons in Europe.

\[35\] Published in *The Representation of the United States Abroad* (New York: American Assembly and School of Business, Columbia University, 1956), pp. 120-53.
RELATIONS WITH STUDENTS

Although no courses were given in the IWPS, it still played a role in student life. During the student troubles in 1968-72, the institute was not a direct target by itself but only as part of the School of International Affairs. In any case, it was the university itself which bore the brunt of rebellion. As the Cox committee report on the disturbances, *Crisis at Columbia*, pointed out, universities were the available target for students unhappy about the Vietnam War, who could not attack the government directly.\textsuperscript{36} The graduate students in regional courses and international relations were less involved in the general protest than the undergraduates of Columbia College. Still, the issues raised by the student uprising were such as to divide the faculty with differing attitudes toward the student demands. “Student power” and the demand for a share in decision-making were of less consequence to the IWPS, but student claims (mostly inaccurate) regarding “secret research” and suspicious sources of funding did call forth occasional responses in the Columbia Spectator from the IWPS director. More radical students caused uneasiness within the institute from before the 1968 outbreak to 1972, sparked by such acts as the invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State killings.

Turning to more positive relationships, research conducted in the IWPS improved course content and teaching in international relations and furthered the involvement of students specializing in this field. Although the vitality of student activity around the IWPS offices waxed and waned, over the years that wing of the SIA building has provided “a kind of clubhouse,” in the words of the first director. Sometimes, with varying effect, the IWPS took active steps to encourage this friendly association.

There were practical reasons for graduate international relations majors to congregate in the IWPS wing. Their international relations professors were housed there, and aside from conferring on courses, consultation regarding dissertations regularly took place. A 1969 report stated that in the five years up

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to that date, two tenured faculty members had between them supervised more than 35 doctor’s theses. In the 1970s, international relations was by far the most popular specialty in political science. As in graduate schools generally, the students were teaching each other, and the IWPS provided a convenient gathering place. The acknowledgments in the preface to the student-composed “Graduate Program in Political Science at Columbia University: A First Year Survival Guide” (1994-5) contained the compiler’s, (Kate O’Neill’s), thanks to “the Institute of War and Peace Studies for a home for the summer, and my co-workers on the 13th floor.”
RELATIONS WITH FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

As indicated earlier, the Institute of War and Peace Studies deliberately avoided government contracts, with very few exceptions (the 1957 report on military assistance for a Senate committee, the ACDA study on arms control and European security, and the arrangement with the U.S. Air Force for the annual seconding of a resident officer). Although Columbia was one of eight universities in a private research consortium sponsored by the Department of Defense and the Institute for Defense Analyses, the IWPS was not involved.

Classified research and studies on subjects directed by a government agency were not acceptable to the IWPS. They did not conform to the function of the institute: to conduct objective studies of mid and long-term policy relevance on subjects of its own choice. In Fox’s view, acceptance would also carry the danger of serving an agency’s possible purpose to create a consensus for a policy already adopted or to give it ammunition in a bureaucratic competition.

Since IWPS studies inevitably dealt with government behavior and objectives of policy and process, there was a connection between the institute’s work and government decision-making. When published, if they were deemed relevant and persuasive, their fruits might come to the attention of policy makers directly or through attentive elite outside the government in the media and elsewhere.

Without necessarily promoting a particular policy advocated by a government agency (or recommending one), the IWPS studies could consider the suitability of such a policy in a more general framework. For example, the pattern of U.S. defense expenditures was analyzed as part of a broader context in Warner

37 On IDA, see Lyons and Morton, *Schools for Strategy*, 1964, pp. 254-57. “Complicity” with this research group was one of the false charges made by the SDS in the 1968 student rebellion.
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The IWPS did not keep government officials at arms’ length. Although it did not follow the old Yale Institute of International Studies practice of circulating the results of studies among relevant officials, the IWPS welcomed two-way communication with them, especially the members of the Department of State. An exchange of ideas and information was deemed appropriate and illuminating.

In response to Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson’s request for suggestions for the department’s Planning and Coordination Staff, Fox wrote:

Freed from week-to-week responsibility to make and justify the pressing decisions of the moment, they (university foreign affairs specialists) can study and evaluate in a wider and longer-term perspective than even the Department’s Planning and Co-ordination Staff. That they can do so with increased relevance and greater constructive impact if channels of informal contact with government experts are kept open goes without saying. If beyond that in particular cases temporary appointment on a part-time or full-time basis allows an academic scholar to be both participant and observer, that scholar’s input of constructive analysis into the policy process will be increased for many years thereafter.39

In fact, some members of the IWPS had earlier served in government agencies, primarily in the Department of State, or went into government service after working at the institute.

Disastrous failures in coordinated foreign policy which culminated in the Vietnam War did concern the institute members. Finally, in the aftermath of the December 1972 bombing of Hanoi, the director and colleagues organized a public forum in January 1973 to discuss the lessons to be derived from this highly

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provocative policy. The letter announcing the meeting spoke of “a crisis of democratic control and a crisis of moral choice,” and of the duty of the concerned scholar to try to find a way out of the morass.

Aside from institute policy, individual members freely served as consultants to government agencies (the directors did so for several). As mentioned earlier, one or two had individual contracts with a government agency. The first director regularly lectured at the various war colleges, including Canada’s National Defense College. The second director, Warner Schilling, also did such lecturing, as did Roger Hilsman. Prior to coming to Columbia Hilsman had been an army officer fighting in Burma in World War II. He had subsequently served in the Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service and then in the State Department, first in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and later as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. Similarly, Howard Wriggins had served in the Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service and then in the State Department Policy Planning Council and in the National Security Council before coming to Columbia. On leave from Columbia, he was the U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka during the Carter administration.

Government speakers often were invited to seminars sponsored by the IWPS. None of these actions eroded the institute’s avoidance of government contracts and defense of its objectivity and freedom of choice.
OTHER RELATIONS OUTSIDE THE UNIVERSITY

A number of IWPS activities had the effect of helping to integrate Columbia with entities in the outside world. One type of connection was joint sponsorship. Thus in 1964, a couple of members joined a group at MIT on an arms control project focused on Latin America. The institute collaborated with the University of Windsor (Ontario) to present a two-day conference on “Canada: the Unknown Neighbor” at Columbia University in November, 1970. The Austrian consulate general in New York also approached the IWPS to present a conference. The product of their collaboration, a conference entitled “Towards the Austrian State Treaty: America’s Austrian Policies. 1945-1955,” celebrated the 25th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty. The meetings were held in the International Affairs Building. Before that site was available, the IWPS joined the Columbia-affiliated Academy of Political Science to conduct a series of discussions on “The Atlantic Community Re-appraised,” which took place in April, 1968. Under the second director of the Canadian Studies Program, John G. Ruggie, another series of studies were carried out with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs of Toronto.

A number of books published under the auspices of the IWPS were joint enterprises with academic groups at, inter alia, Yale, Harvard, and Johns Hopkins. Similarly, other books were jointly published with such private organizations as the Council on Foreign Relations in New York or the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Several of the series of seminars mentioned earlier, such as the Compton and New York Arms Control seminars, were regularly attended by interested outsiders from the region. Participants came from business, journalism, the professions, and government. The annual conferences of the Canadian Studies Program always included such people, as well as participants from Canada.

On the individual level, the IWPS was host to many scholars from outside Columbia, as mentioned earlier. By 1971
these had already totaled eighteen from other American universities, fourteen from foreign universities, and six from government agencies.\footnote{“The Institute of War and Peace Studies Program for 1971-1976,” mimeo., October 1971.} The IWPS cultivated particularly close relations with members from Australian National University’s School of Pacific Studies. Interchanges of this nature were extolled by participants as mutually enriching. The dean of the School of International Affairs, in an August 1977 report, remarked with respect to all the institutes, “Perhaps one of their most important contributions is the stimulation they provide to Columbia’s intellectual competence through attracting foreign scholars, men and women of affairs and faculty members from overseas. . . . [T]hese institutes do much to maintain Columbia’s reputation as one of the leading research universities in the world.”

Also on the individual level, IWPS members were associated with a number of outside groups which had significant impact on their research. This was particularly true of the first director. Early in the life of the institute, Fox was not only organizing the program on civil/military relations at Columbia, but was also the chairman of the Social Science Research Council’s Committee on National Security Policy Research. At that time, he later recalled, he was not always sure which hat he was wearing. His close connections with administrators of the big foundations—Carnegie Corporation, Rockefeller, and Ford—were not formal. Instead, he once called himself “an instant staff man,” referring to the frequent telephone calls he received asking for his counsel. Being president of the International Studies Association in 1972 put him in contact with others in that field throughout the United States as well as abroad, where he was known not only as head of the I.S.A., but as head of the IWPS.

Individual members naturally had numerous professional ties to, and leadership in, associations related to their expertise which were not dependent upon their role in the IWPS. Similarly, their professional knowledge qualified them to counsel public policy leaders, government agencies, and the public through the news media, regardless of IWPS membership. Being on the
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Columbia faculty was far more significant for this common practice. Nevertheless, identification with the IWPS did underline their status. In like manner, the reputation of the institute put it on the itinerary arranged by the Department of State in its programs for special foreign visitors. As with other aspects of the way IWPS functioned, it was not easy to separate individual activity from institute activity.
CONCLUSIONS

This brief history concludes with the end of Warner Schilling’s term of office, which he held for ten years following the 25-year tenure of the first director. Since that time, directors have held office for much shorter periods, and so have deans of the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA). Other changes include the creation of SIPA’s Department of International and Public Affairs, which shares the 13th floor with the IWPS and focuses on instruction. More earth-shaking events have taken place in the outside world, most particularly the end of the Cold War. The dust needs to settle before a history of this later period can be sensibly written.

Although the role of research in the IWPS was to concentrate on mid- and long-term international developments conditioning policy making, the collapse of the Soviet Union was not an active subject of the members’ study. Apparently, scholars did not take seriously a question Professor Fox earlier put in a doctoral examination: “What would the Soviet Union have to do for us to declare the Cold War over?” His reiterated assertion, that “peace is not enough,” did eventuate in studies of such problems as north-south relations, but research recognition of the importance of environment questions to international affairs did not occur until after the period covered by this history.

The range of choice which Fox saw as widening due to international relations research was determined in part by what the scholars chose to investigate. In a report to the Carnegie Corporation regarding the product of its major grant, Fox cited twenty-six doctoral dissertations completed between 1967 and 1981 that dealt in some way with the national security process, foreign and military policy coordination, and civil-military relations. He noted the “indirect effects” on the direction of research of graduate students, who were responding to their professors’ research on the national security policy process.41 The need to improve decision making in world politics by

41 William T. R. Fox to Sara L. Englehard, Carnegie Corporation, July 9, 1981.
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sophisticating those in charge, a leading concern in the IWPS in its earlier years, has been alleviated. This change is partly the result of the greatly expanded international studies nationwide, to which the IWPS has contributed.

Ways of measuring the impact of the IWPS are very limited. General judgments were not uncommon in the past. For example, on June 21, 1976, President William J. McGill wrote to the first director, “In the subtle and sophisticated effort to learn the practical and theoretical conditions for peace in the free world, the Institute of War and Peace Studies has done an outstanding job.” A more specific measurement is the very large number of works which were published under its auspices. As the annual report sometimes mentioned, the total compared very favorably with the output of much larger institutes. The impact of the IWPS can also be seen in the number of scholars associated with the institute who later became leaders in academia or public affairs, including many in government service. Quantity and quality here are also impressive. (To name them might be invidious, but those who served in high public offices include, among others, Michael H. Armacost, Joan E. Spero, Lynn E. Davis, and Catherine McArdle Kelleher.)

With the end of the Cold War and an apparent decrease in threats to national security, concern for policy, or at least the policy-making process, diminished. Thus, the shift in members’ interests toward more general theoretical questions in international relations is understandable. Meanwhile, it is impossible to judge whether any particular work done in the IWPS affected public policy, even though it might lay out the range of choice, a range which increased as it was studied. Conflicts which could have been avoided had the scholars’ wisdom been heeded might be easy to cite, but much harder is a judgment of the beneficial effects on government action which might be attributed to their work.

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Conclusions

Perhaps the work of institute members was more significant in educating academics about government policy than enlightening government officials with academic insights. In any case, a more direct influence on government policy came as a result of consulting or full-time government assignments, which benefited from the members’ earlier academic studies.

That each member could freely choose what questions to pursue was as clearly evident at the end of the period studies as at the beginning. One might question whether this individualism contributes to fissiparous tendencies in the IWPS, diminishing its policy relevance as a body. The esprit de corps continues to depend on personal relationships, not on formal procedures or a set area of scholarly concentration. Is there another danger: that members end up as academic experts talking to academic experts in a closed system? 43

One unchangeable feature of the institute is the influence of foundation funding on the choices of individual members. As long as the IWPS depends on such financing to function, that delimitation will continue. Foundations have policy objectives, at least in general form. In this way, IWPS members cannot escape taking into consideration the relevance of their work to such policy objectives.

The challenge continues to be how to balance “scientific” studies of middle and long range problems in world politics with the desire to have a practical effect. William Fox liked to refer to the importance of cultivating the orchard rather than picking the apples of a particular tree when describing the function of IWPS research. The choice of orchards was only partly up to the members of the institute. As the Cold War faded from the perspectives of leaders as a source for concern with international events, so did the demand for aid from scholars in understanding developments occurring outside the United States. Although serious threats remain, security problems appeared to have lost the urgency of the Cold War period. Whatever earlier use decision-makers might have made of their analyses (which is unclear),

improvements in government decision-making no longer seemed a major task for international relations scholars. Both the first and second IWPS directors called attention to the continuing need to tackle issues beyond the capacity of a single state to handle alone, but the funding proved harder and harder to secure. Even the number of political science graduate students specializing in international relations diminished noticeably from its high point in the 1970s. Also diminished was the number of foreign scholars attracted to the institute, partly due to the lack of funding available.

Aside from these changes, the IWPS continued to function autonomously along with the other institutes in the School of International and Public Affairs with relatively few administrative constraints on its choices. Not very different in one respect from the traditional departments, however, they would always be engaged in some contests with the central administration.

The intermingling of IWPS and Department of Political Science functions continued; as Robert Frost observed, “Something there is that does not love a wall.” Members continued to share educational responsibilities, which included service as Director of Graduate Studies in International Relations. The institute’s function, as noted in a 1973-74 report, was to “provide supporting services, an environment for informal interchange, editorial sponsorship for prospective publication and a forum for actively relating current ‘non-area’ international relations research to a continuously updated graduate teaching program.”

Despite the assimilation of some IWPS and Department of Political Science activities, the very nature of international relations requires an inter-disciplinary approach. Support for this perspective continues to come from the physical proximity of various academic specialties in the International Affairs Building.

Increased interest in environmental policy (forecast earlier by Fox) has resulted in ties between IWPS research and other Columbia endeavors in this field. Does this suggest that growing attention by some IWPS members to “international political economy” might profit from renewing earlier ties to members of the neighboring School of Business? Are there non-academic
constituencies with a need for better understanding of international
affairs, which could offer a market for IWPS research?

Continuing the institute’s policy of no government contracts in order to preserve its neutral status was easy. The tempting opportunities had vanished.

The IWPS director’s capacity to decide remained relatively uncircumscribed within the university, and members continued to decide their own research preferences. As the history of the institute unfolded, the market for their choices appeared to change. As the first director warned in the mid-1970’s, each member would become his (or her) own entrepreneur. What helped them to implement their choice of research was their membership in the IWPS.
APPENDIX

BOOKS PUBLISHED UNDER IWPS AUSPICES THROUGH 1985


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Appendix


Appendix


